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Abstract 
Purpose - This study investigates how bank size affects the role of information asymmetry on 
financial access in a panel of 162 banks in 39 African countries for the period 2001-2011.   
Design/methodology/approach - The empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable 
Fixed Effects regressions with overlapping and non-overlapping bank size thresholds to control 
for the QLH (Quiet Life Hypothesis). The QLH postulates that managers of large banks will use 
their privileges for private gains at the expense of making financial services more accessible to 
the general public. Financial access is measured with loan price and loan quantity whereas 
information asymmetry is implicit in the activities of public credit registries and private credit 
bureaus.   
Findings - The findings with non-overlapping thresholds are broadly consistent with those that 
are conditional on overlapping thresholds. First, public credit registries have a decreasing effect 
on the price of loans with the magnitude of reduction comparable across all bank size thresholds. 
Second, both public credit registries and private credit bureaus enhance the quantity of loans. 
Third, compared with public credit registries,  private credit bureaus have a greater influence in 
increasing financial access because they have a significantly higher  favourable effect on the 
quantity  and price of loans Fourth, the QLH is not apparent because large banks are not 
associated with lower levels of financial access compared to small banks.  
Originality/value - Studies of public credit registries and private credit bureaus in Africa are 
sparse. This is one of the few to assess linkages between bank size, information asymmetry and 
financial access.  
JEL Classification: G20; G29; L96; O40; O55  
Keywords: Public goods; Financial access; Bank size; Information sharing 
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1. Introduction 
 
Basic financial access in the form of deposit, credit, payment or insurance to individuals and 
corporations has been constrained in Africa by several factors, inter alia: physical access, 
affordability and eligibility (Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b; 
Fanta, 2016; Makina, 2017; Chikalipah, 2017).  According to this narrative, major challenges 
confronting efforts at curbing the problem are issues of moral hazard and adverse selection 
driven by information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers.  Policy measures have 
culminated in the establishment of credit monitoring offices, notably public credit registries and 
private credit bureaus. These have been essentially motivated by the need to increase information 
sharing between financial institutions and their customers in order to mitigate the underlying 
issue of information asymmetry.  
A substantial bulk of theoretical research is consistent with the position that asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders may stifle the efficient allocation of capital 
(Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017a, b; Triki & Gajigo, 2014). Accordingly, lenders often face adverse 
selection problems because they are confronted with the inability to observe borrowers’ 
characteristics, especially the riskiness of their investment projects. Moreover, the issue may be 
compounded by a further inability of lenders to control borrowers’ actions when credit is 
granted. In essence, a borrower could conceal the proceeds of his/her investment to prevent debt 
repayment or diminish his/her alert to the possibility of default. Such scenarios are not particular 
of insolvent borrowers because even solvent borrowers could be tempted to avoid compliance 
with their financial obligations if the lender is unable to monitor the activities for which a loan is 
granted. The unavoidable consequence from lenders may be the charging of higher interest rates 
and rationing of credit. Information sharing between lenders can augment borrowers’ 
motivations to repay and foster credit activity.  The role of public credit registries and private 
credit bureaus as information brokers have favourable effects including, among others enabling 
the efficient allocation of capital, increasing competition in the credit market and relaxing credit 
constraints (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002).  
In the light of the above, much scholarly attention in the banking literature has recently 
been focused on examining the role of information sharing among creditors and the impacts of 
stronger creditor rights to information access. The latter strand has investigated the role of 
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stronger creditor rights in, inter alia: bankruptcy (Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 
2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009) and bank risk-taking (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 
2011). The former strand has assessed how information sharing could: improve credit 
availability (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014), reduce the cost of 
credit (Brown et al., 2009), mitigate default rates (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002), influence corrupt-
lending (Barth et al., 2009), weigh on antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012) and affect 
syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010).  
Noticeably in the above literature, the orientation towards regions where issues of access 
to finance are most apparent is sparse. Accordingly, while a substantial bulk of the literature has 
targeted the developed countries and the emerging economies of Latin America and Asia, little is 
known about the African continent which unfortunately is the  region with the lowest level of 
financial development (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Bongomin et al., 2016; Charles & Mori, 2016; 
Wale & Makina, 2017; Bocher et al., 2017)1. In addition, as far as we have reviewed, the 
literature leaves room for improvement with a significant number of gaps, namely: (i) in 
endogeneity concerns; (ii) the implicit distinction between the price and quantity effects of 
information asymmetry and (iii) the incidence of bank size (with associated market power) on 
the impact of information sharing. First, a plethora of studies in empirical literature have 
consistently failed to account for endogeneity, which could lead to biased estimates and 
misplaced policy implications2. In principle, adverse selection and moral hazard issues cannot be 
properly examined without an exogenous instrument (Ivashina, 2009, p. 301).  Second, contrary 
to recent literature on information asymmetry (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010) and 
information sharing (Galindo & Miller, 2001; Houston et al., 2010; Triki & Gajigo, 2014), a 
clear distinction between the price and quantity effects of information sharing is essential for 
more calibrated policy implications. This is primarily because a fundamental objective of 
reducing (increasing) information asymmetry (information sharing) is to improve banking 
intermediation efficiency to (i) increase loans to borrowers at (ii) affordable prices. Third, the 
                                                          
1
 Consistent with Triki and Gajigo  (2014) (which have focused on 42 African countries), Galindo and Miller 
(2001), Love and Mylenko (2003) and Barth et al. (2009) have positioned their studies on zero, four and nine 
African countries respectively. The scope of our study is 42 African countries.     
2
 Inter alia: Ordinary Least Squares (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, pp. 2033-38) and controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity among countries (Triki & Gajigo,  2014) do not go far enough in addressing the inherent simultaneous 
effects between public credit registries (Private credit bureaus ) and the banking industry.  
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role of bank size in the incidence of information sharing is relevant in order to control for the 
potential abuse of market power by managers as proposed by  the quiet life hypothesis (QLH)3. 
Banking competition is reputed  to consolidate the favourable impact of information sharing on 
lending in the event that credit markets can be contested, the sharing of information improves 
competition and it mitigates informational rents which could result in greater lending (Pagano & 
Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019).  
This paper attempts to fill the above gaps in the following ways. First, by controlling for 
endogeneity, we employ an instrumental variable empirical strategy for our independent 
variables of particular interest (i.e., public credit registries and private credit bureaus). Second, 
we individually account for price and quantity effects for more policy implications/options.  
Third, the empirical strategy adopts both overlapping and non-overlapping bank size thresholds 
to control a possibility for the QLH in the underlying relationships. Assessing this potential for 
the QLH is consistent with the problem statement that aims to examine if bank managers are 
abusing privileges from information sharing with public credit registries and private credit 
bureaus. The intuition motivating this empirical exercise is that blanket policies may not be 
effective unless they are contingent on bank size (with related market power) and tailored 
differently across markets with varying portfolios of bank size.  
In the light of the above, the key research question which we seek to answer in this paper 
is the following: does bank size affect the impact of information sharing on financial access  in 
terms of quantity and prices of loans?  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
focuses on conceptual clarifications. These comprise linkages between loan price, loan quantity 
and information asymmetry on the one hand and measurements of loan price, loan quantity and 
information asymmetry on the other. The methodology and data are discussed in Section 3.  
Section 4 reports and discusses the key results from the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes 
with future research directions.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 According to the QLH, firms with higher market power invest less in pursuing intermediation efficiency: instead of 
taking advantage of their favourable position by granting more loans to borrowers at affordable prices, they prefer to 
enjoy a “quiet life” or an exploitation of market power to achieve their personal goals (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 
2010). 
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2. Literature review and conceptual clarifications 
2.1 Literature review  
While there is a bulk of studies on the connection between information asymmetry and financial 
access, the extant literature that has focused on Africa is  rare. This is probably because private 
credit bureaus and public credit registries were only introduced in Africa in 2004, for the most 
part (see Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017a). Hence, owing to concerns in degrees of freedom, the 
new data has not been exploited until recently. Discussion in this section is structured in two 
main strands. They are: (i) the broad non-contemporary literature that largely fails to incorporate 
African countries and (ii) the contemporary African finance literature.  
 In the first strand, Galindo and Miller (2001) have established that in nations where credit 
registries are in an advanced stage of development, restrictions to financial access are less 
apparent. Conversely, countries in which credit registries are in  their infancy (or not yet 
introduced) experience more restrictions to financial access. Moreover, the authors have further 
posited that well-performing credit registries account for a considerable reduction in the 
sensitivity of firms to investment decisions. Love and Mylenko (2003) have combined firm-level 
information from the World Bank Business Environment (WBES) with data on information 
sharing offices (public credit registries and private credit bureaus) to investigate whether or not 
better information sharing on credit history  from banks affect financing constraints favourably 
within the framework of managers. The results have shown that when private credit registries are 
apparent, there are lower financing constraints and better access to financial services.  By 
contrast, public registries do not have a noticeable effect in reducing financing restrictions.  
Using the WEBS covering 4,000 corporations in 56 countries and private credit offices in 129 
nations, Barth et al. (2009) examined the effect of “borrower and lender competition” and 
information sharing on corrupt-lending. Two principal results are established. On the one hand, 
competition within the banking industry and information sharing reduce corruption associated 
with lending. On the other, corrupt-lending is also strongly affected by the following features: 
ownership structure of banks, competition within firms and the legal environment.  
 Before we delve into the second aspect that is concerned with studies focused on Africa, 
it is worthwhile articulating the scant non-contemporary literature on the continent with some 
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critical insights into the literature engaged in the first strand4.  Galindo and Miller (2001) 
considered no African country. Love and Mylenko (2003) and Bath et al. (2009) respectively 
included four and nine countries on the continent.  Triki and Gajigo (2014), focusing exclusively 
on Africa, have investigated a sample of 42 countries for the period 2006-2009. The authors 
were motivated by two main concerns: (i) the effect of information sharing offices on firms’ 
access to finance and (ii) the relevance of the design of public credit registries in the severity of 
constraints on finance. They concluded that (i) private credit bureaus more positively affect 
financial access when compared with public credit registries or environments where no 
information sharing office is apparent and (ii) considerable heterogeneity exists in the design of 
information sharing offices and financial access across countries with public credit registries. 
Asongu et al. (2016) investigated the role of information sharing in financial access to establish 
that for the most part, information sharing offices are not playing their theoretical role of 
reducing information asymmetry for financial access.  Asongu et al. (2017) investigated the role 
of information sharing offices in reducing market power for financial access so as to confirm that 
in order for information sharing to reduce market power in view of enhancing financial access, 
private credit bureaus should be between 1.4 percent and 18.4 percent coverage while public 
credit registries should be between 3.16 percent and 3.3 percent exposure. Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2017) incorporated financial sectors into the analysis to conclude that the positive 
complementarity of information sharing offices and financial formalization is an increasing 
function of financial credit access while the negative complementarity of information sharing 
offices and financial informalization is a decreasing function of credit access. Mauza and 
Alagidede (2017) re-examined the law-finance theory in the light of the investigated relationship 
to establish that, compared to French civil law countries, English common law countries are 
benefiting more in financial access owing to information sharing by means of credit registries.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Accordingly, in spite of the substantially documented concerns of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; 
Asongu, 2014) and recurrent issues of access to finance in the African business literature (Alagidede, 2008; Bartels 
et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Darley, 2012), the recent literature on financial access in Africa 
has failed to substantially incorporate the dimension of information sharing by means of private credit bureaus and 
public credit registries (Fowowe, 2014: Asongu, 2014, 2016; Daniel, 2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 
2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017).   
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2.2 Theoretical underpinnings  
 
This section has two main motives. First, we discuss the theoretical underpinnings on the 
relationships between information asymmetry, loan price and loan quantity. Second, we use the 
theoretical foundations to justify our third contribution to the literature discussed in the 
introductory section.  
On the first strand, consistent with Jappelli and Pagano (2002), three potential (or 
theoretical) effects result from reducing information asymmetry or exchanging of information 
about borrowers by lenders. (i) The information sharing offices (ISO)5 enable more precise 
prediction of the probability of repayment by improving banks’ awareness of borrowers’ 
characteristics. This mitigates adverse selection issues as it allows lenders to better target and 
price loans. (ii) ISO stifle informational rents that otherwise could have been extracted by banks 
from their customers. This obliges lenders to be more competitive within the credit market in the 
pricing of loans, which lowers interest rates, improves borrowers’ margin and hence the 
incentives to repay. (iii) ISO could also act as a disciplinary device for borrowers: a mechanism 
which mitigates moral hazard by improving borrowers’ incentives to perform. Accordingly, all 
borrowers are conscious of the fact that, a default will limit their access to the credit market or 
make credit more expensive for them because their reputation with other banks would have been 
tarnished. While the first effect arises from adverse selection, the two other impacts result from 
moral hazard.  
The initial effect of reducing information asymmetry draws from the pure adverse 
selection model developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993) which suggests that information 
sharing mitigates “average interest rates”, increases the number of borrowers and drives-down 
defaults. Accordingly, banks have information on the credit worthiness of local residents but not 
on immigrants, which gives rise to adverse selection. The exchange of private information about 
residents by banks can mitigate default rates and lead to safe lending to immigrants, but the 
overall incidence on lending remains ambiguous for an obvious reason: the reduction in lending 
to risky borrowers may be higher (or lower) than the implied increase in lending to safe 
borrowers.  
                                                          
5
 ISO will be subsequently used to represent both public credit registries and private credit bureaus.  For elements of style, ISO 
can also be used interchangeably with public credit registries and private credit bureaus.  
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The other effects from moral hazard reveal the evidence that information sharing 
consolidates borrowers’ incentives not to default, either through mitigation of banks’ rents 
(second effect) or via discipline (third effect). For the second impact, the exchange of 
information between banks drives-down the informational rents that banks can extract within 
lending relationships from borrowers (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). To present this effect in more 
detail, Padilla and Pagano (1997) used a two-period model in which banks have private 
information about their clients. The informational endowment gives banks some market power 
over their customers and hence, leads to a hold-up issue: borrowers could have low motivation to 
perform, which may further lead to high interest and default rates and a potential crumble of the 
credit market because banks are expected to demand high rates in the future. Hence, banks limit 
their potential ability to reap informational rents by committing to sharing information on 
clients’ characteristics. This mitigates the default probability of clients and the interest rate 
charged on them which ultimately increase the quantity of loans in comparison to a regime in 
which information is not shared.  
With regards to the third effect, even in the absence of a hold-up issue, the  impact on 
incentives still exists. This occurs when banks exchange data on past defaults beyond sharing 
information on borrower type, which eventually creates a disciplinary effect (Padilla & Pagano, 
2000). Within this framework, the sharing of default information comes with a penalty of higher 
interest rate because default is viewed as a sign of bad quality by outside banks. In order to 
assuage this penalty, more effort is exerted by entrepreneurs, leading to more lending and lower 
interest and default rates. On the contrary, information exchange can also reduce lending because 
banks lose all potential informational rents and hence, their willingness to lend is motivated only 
by a higher repayment probability.  
The second strand justifying our third contribution to the literature draws from a common 
denominator to all three models: they are consistent on the prediction that, while sharing 
information mitigates default rates, the incidence on lending is ambiguous. Hence, the effect of 
reducing information asymmetry on financial access remains open to debate.  
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2.3 Conceptual clarifications  
This section is discussed in two main parts. The first clarifies the concepts of loan and loan 
quantity. The second informs on the theory of information asymmetry. With regard to the first 
strand, loan price can be measured in various ways. First, in a lending syndicate, it is appreciated 
by a loan spread which is the difference between the average price charged by the participant 
banks and the interest offered by the lead bank (Ivashina, 2009, Tanjung et al., 2010). Second, it 
could also be measured as the price charged on the quantity of loans which is represented as the 
ratio of “Gross interest and dividend income” plus “Total non-interest operation income”  to of 
“Total assets” (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). Third, in pricing corporate and small business 
loans, most methods are based on discounting future cash flows (Benzschawel et al., 2012) 
As far as we have uncovered, the measurement of loan quantity is straight forward: the 
amount of personal, small business and corporate loans (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002) which may be 
presented in natural logarithm or as a percentage of of total assets (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 
2010) to achieve comparability with other variables. In cases of disequilibrium when the bank 
faces excess or limited demand in the loan market, the optimal quantity of loans can be 
influenced by a number of factors, among others tightening or relaxing restrictions by loan 
quality and limiting or increasing the number of loans of a given quality (Elosegui & Villamil, 
2002).  
As far as the second part is concerned, an extensive literature has analyzed the issue of 
measuring information asymmetry in terms of bank value and therefore corresponding payoffs in 
loan price and quantity. The appreciation of adverse selection and moral hazard already outlined 
above can be done in a multitude of ways, inter alia: index construction ownership and ISO.   
First, index construction is largely used in financial markets where the presence of better 
informed traders may affect price formation (Bharath et al., 2009, p. 3215). Since it is logical to 
ascertain that market players (e.g., analysts, employees, traders and suppliers) which are closer to 
a firm and its business  are those that make informed trading decisions about it, market 
microstructure analysts have attempted to estimate the degree to which information asymmetry 
about a particular corporation is observable from market data (transaction prices, quotes, trades, 
bid-ask spreads…etc). These underpinnings have been extended to other areas of finance in order 
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to help researchers identify firms’ information environment which is presently an intrinsically 
elusive concept (Bharath et al., 2009).  
Second, the theoretical literature maintains that “ownership” should be an important 
channel for reducing information asymmetry (Ivashina, 2009, p. 300). In this light, a higher 
quality of the underlying project would induce an increase in the informed party’s share of 
ownership in order to mitigate the cost of asymmetric information. In a lending syndicate 
between the lead bank and participants, a special case of asymmetric information is offered by 
the syndicated loan market. According to the theoretical predictions, the lead bank’s share in the 
ownership of a loan reduces the overall loan spread because information asymmetry is  
moderated between the lead and participants (Ivashina, 2009). Hence asymmetric information in 
a loan is observable from the loan spread (Tanjung et al., 2010, p. 2). The lead is confronted with 
adverse selection before syndication and moral hazard after syndication if its share is low. This is 
essentially because it collects and processes borrower information by acting as an agent in the 
lending syndication. 
Third, ISO also lessens information asymmetry by collecting and sharing information on 
borrower characteristics. While the theoretical foundations of adverse selection and moral hazard 
have already been covered above, we elucidate why it is important to distinguish between public 
credit registries and private credit bureaus in the measurement of the phenomenon.  Consistent 
with Triki and Gajigo (2014), there are six main distinguishing features between public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus: purpose, coverage, ownership, status, data sources used and 
access. First, whereas public credit registries are public institutions that are created with the 
principal mission of supervising the banking sector, private credit bureaus are created because of 
the need (demand) of (for) reliable credit information on borrowers in the market. Hence, 
information from public credit registries from which lenders assess the credit-worthiness of 
clients could also be considered as a collateral benefit or by-product of public credit registries. 
Second, while the coverage provided by public credit registries is mainly of large corporations 
and limited in terms of history and type of data provided, private credit bureaus extend beyond 
large corporations (to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs)), with a longer history and 
richer data. Third, on ownership, public credit registries belong to governments or central banks. 
On the other hand, the ownership of private credit bureaus extends beyond governments (or 
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central banks) to lenders, lenders’ associations and independent third parties.  Fourth, public 
credit registries (private credit bureaus) are not (mainly) for profit. Fifth, data used by public 
credit registries is sourced from bank and non-bank financial institutions while private credit 
bureaus add public credit registries, tax authorities, courts and utilities to the sources used by 
public credit registries, for information. Sixth, access to public credit registries (private credit 
bureaus) is restricted to information providers (open to all types of lenders).  
 
3. Methodology and Data  
3.1 Methodology 
As highlighted in the introduction, accounting for endogeneity is crucial for the soundness of our 
empirical strategy. This is essentially because, while the banking industry depends on ISO for 
borrower information, ISO also depend on borrower solvency history from the banking industry 
in providing recommendations. In a nutshell, the very concept of “information sharing” (in the 
mitigation of information asymmetry) by definition entails reverse causality (Ivashina, 2009, p. 
301). Hence, ISO are also endogenous and the adverse selection/moral hazard effect cannot be 
identified without an exogenous instrument. To control for the potential endogeneity between 
ISO and banks activities, we instrument ISO metrics with their first lags and control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity in bank size, capital openness, “compliance with Sharia code of 
conduct for financial services providers” and ownership characteristics. Further robustness 
checks are ensured using: (i) overlapping and non-overlapping bank size thresholds (ii) 
alternative specifications to account for perfect substitution (or correlation) of information in the 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity and (iii) robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent (HAC) standard errors.  
This estimation approach can be summarized in the following equations.  
First-stage regression:  
 itit sInstrumentPCBPCR )(/ 10  itj X it
                                                (1)                                                                                                   
Second-stage regression: 
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ititit PCBPCRQP )()(/ 210   itj X
  
it
                                           (2)          
In Eqs. (1) and (2), X is a vector of control variables which include: bank characteristics 
(Deposits/Assets, Bank branches), market features (GDP per capita growth, inflation and 
population density) and the unobserved heterogeneity ( bank size, capital restrictions, ownership 
and “compliance with Sharia finance code”). PCR (PCB) represent public credit registries 
(private credit bureaus) while P(Q) denote the price (quantity) of loans. The instruments are first 
lags. For Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), it
 
and it  respectively represent the error terms. tiQ ,  is the proxy 
for the quantity of loans in bank i at period t. In the two equations, the dependent variables (PCR, 
PCB, P and Q) are separately regressed on the disclosed independent and control variables.  
In the first-stage, we regress the PCR/PCB on their first lags conditional on other 
covariates (control variables) and use the corresponding fitted (or instrumented) values in the 
principal (or second-stage) regressions. Accordingly, we verify that the instruments are 
exogenous to the endogenous components of the PCR/PCB, which is a prime condition for the 
instrumental variable (IV) approach.  
                                                               
 
3.2 Data 
We examine a panel of 162 banks with annual data from Bankscope, World Development 
Indicators, and Chinn and Ito (2002, 2013) for the period 2001 to 20116. Limitations to the 
sample of 39 countries, number of banks and periodicity are due to constraints in data 
availability at the time of the study. The definitions and sources of variables are provided in 
Table 1. The dependent variables proxying for “loan quantity” and “loan price” are respectively, 
the “natural logarithm of loans” and “price charged on loans” (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The 39 sampled countries which are based on data availability constraints at the time of the study are: Algeria; 
Angola; Benin; Burkina Faso; Botswana;  Burundi; Cameroon; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Côte 
d’Ivoire; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gabon; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; 
Mauritania; Mauritius; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra 
Leone; South Africa; Sudan; Swaziland; Tanzania; Togo; Tunisia; Uganda and Zambia.  
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Table 1: Definitions and sources of variables  
Variables  Signs Variables’ Definitions Sources 
    
Quantity   Qty Logarithm of Loans   BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
Public credit registries   PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Private credit bureaus  PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Openness  Open Positive de juré capital openness 
(KAOPEN>0) 
Chinn & Ito (2002, 
2013) 
    
Closedness   Close Negative de juré capital openness 
(KAOPEN≤0)  
Chinn & Ito (2002, 
2013) 
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.  KAOPEN takes higher values for more open financial regimes and is the first 
principal component of four binary variables in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
 
The study controls for bank-focused features (Deposits/Assets, Bank branches), market-
level characteristics (GDP per capita growth, inflation and population density) and the 
unobserved heterogeneity in bank size (small vs. large), capital restrictions (de juré openness vs. 
closure), ownership (domestic vs. foreign) and “compliance with Sharia finance” (Islamic vs. 
non-Islamic). 
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First, the following are worth noting for bank-level characteristics. (i) We expect the 
deposit to asset ratio to increase the quantity and price of loans. This is essentially because 
deposits are the principal financing source of banks. Accordingly, a higher fraction of deposits 
among liabilities could increase loan quantity (and interest margins) since it requires good 
organization for mobilization and management. (ii) From intuition, the number of bank branches 
should have a negative (positive) effect on the price (quantity) of loans because of the 
competition-effect, which drives-down prices while increasing quantity.  
Second, on market-oriented features we also note the following. (i) GDP per capita 
growth that has been included to account for business cycle fluctuations is naturally expected to 
have a positive effect on loan quantity with an ambiguous sign on loan price, which is 
contingent on market dynamism and expansion. However, depleting GDP per capita could 
negatively affect loan quantity and loan price because of low demand. Hence, we expect 
negative signs because during the past decade, GDP per capita in most African countries has 
dwindled: population has increased at a faster rate than GDP growth (Asongu, 2013). (ii) The 
coefficient for  population density is expected to bear a positive sign both for the quantity and 
price of loans. Thus, a greater demand for bank loans owing to high population density should 
drive-up loan prices. (iii) Inflation should decrease (increase) the quantity (price) of loans. This 
is essentially because there is less investment (or loan quantity) in times of economic uncertainty 
(or inflation) and the price of loans naturally increases with inflation uncertainty.   
Third, it is difficult to establish a priori the expected signs for all the fixed effects. For 
example, bank size (small vs. big), could engender both negative and positive effects on loan 
dynamics depending on organization and co-ordination issues associated with bigger banks. 
Dealing with more bank branches (linked to larger bank size) could also generate inefficiencies 
owing to the problems encountered in fulfilling all customers’ needs. In the same vein, the 
effects of ownership (domestic vs. foreign), restrictions to capital (open vs. closed) and 
“compliance with Sharia finance” (Islamic vs. non-Islamic) depend on a plethora of factors, 
notably: organizational capabilities of staff on the one hand,  dynamism and expansion of 
markets on the other.  The choice of these information asymmetry and control variables is 
consistent with recent literature (Asongu & Biekpe, 2017). As presented in Table 1: (i) small 
banks are financial institutions for which the ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets for a given 
16 
 
period is less than or equal to 0.50 (i.e. ≤ 0.50) while big banks are financial institutions for 
which the ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets for a given period is higher than 0.50 (i.e. >0.50); 
(ii) open banks are financial institutions with a positive de juré capital openness (KAOPEN>0) 
while banks that are considered as closed have a negative or null de juré capital openness 
(KAOPEN≤0) and (iii) the  identification of Islamic banks is consistent with Beck et al. (2010) 
and Ali (2012). The classification criterion of bank size is consistent with intuition and recent 
literature (Boateng et al., 2017). 
The Appendix shows the summary statistics, correlation matrix (which depicts the 
relationships between the key variables employed in the paper), and variable sources (and 
corresponding definitions). It can be noticed from the summary statistics in Appendix 1 that the 
degree of variation in the data implies that reasonable estimated relationships can be derived. 
Appendix 2 presents a correlation matrix that helps to mitigate concerns of multicollinearity. 
Based on an initial evaluation of the correlation coefficients, there are no issues in the linkages to 
be estimated. The sources and definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1 while 
Appendix 3 discloses country-specific details on information sharing offices.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 This section assesses three main issues: (i) the effect of information asymmetry on the 
loan price; (ii) the impact of information sharing on quantity of loans and (iii) the relevance of 
the QLH. To examine these concerns, we use an instrumental variable (IV) estimation strategy 
with overlapping and non-overlapping bank size thresholds.  Table 2 presents findings based on 
overlapping bank size thresholds whereas the results of Table 3 are based on non-overlapping 
bank size thresholds. Panel A of either table focuses on the price of loans whereas Panel B is 
concerned with the quantity of loans. Owing to concerns of perfect multicollinearity, only one 
aspect of each feature of the unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for in each table. For 
example, on the feature of bank ownership, whereas Table 2 controls for domestic banks, Table 3 
accounts for foreign banks.  
 The following findings can be established from Table 2 on overlapping bank size 
thresholds. First, public credit registries have a reducing effect on the price of loans with the 
magnitude of reduction almost the same across thresholds. Second, the effect of private credit 
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bureaus on the price of loans is positive in the smallest threshold of bank size.  Third, both public 
credit registries and private credit bureaus increase the quantity of loans with the magnitude of 
increment broadly rising when bigger banks are included in the distribution. Moreover, from a 
comparative perspective, private credit bureaus more positively affect the quantity of loans when 
compared with public credit registries. Fourth, the QLH is not apparent because large banks are 
not associated with lower levels of financial access relative to small banks. Fifth, most of the 
significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
Table 2: Loan and Quantity Effects Using Overlapping Bank Size Thresholds  
       
 Dependent Variables: Price of Loan and Quantity of Loan 
  
 Panel A:  Price of Loan 
       
 Baseline Size ≤ 0.10 Size ≤ 0.25 Size ≤ 0.50 Size ≤ 0.75 Size ≤ 0.90 
Constant  0.0736*** n.a 0.0669*** n.a 0.0732*** 0.0734*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
IVPCR (Pub.) -0.0005*** -0.0005** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
IVPCB (Priv.) 0.0001 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.562) (0.089) (0.262) (0.631) (0.639) (0.599) 
GDPpcg -0.0007** -0.0012** -0.0007 -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0007* 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.121) (0.054) (0.069) (0.060) 
Inflation  0.0008*** 0.0007** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. density 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00006 0.00006 0.00006 
 (0.180) (0.355) (0.371) (0.233) (0.212) (0.187) 
Deposit/Assets 0.0415*** 0.0610*** 0.0510*** 0.0438*** 0.0425*** 0.0428*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.0013*** -0.0019* -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** 
 (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small banks 0.0017 0.0687*** n.a 0.0707*** -0.0023 -0.0019 
 (0.659) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.646) (0.700) 
Big banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Cap. Openness  0.0083 0.0007 0.0080 0.0103 0.0105 0.0085 
 (0.208) (0.937) (0.390) (0.170) (0.132) (0.209) 
Cap. Closedness --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Domestic banks 0.0006 0.0076 0.0060 0.0039 0.0031 0.0032 
 (0.926) (0.366) (0.421) (0.576) (0.652) (0.638) 
Foreign banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Islamic banks -0.0125 -0.0190 -0.0095 -0.0155 -0.0126 -0.0129 
 (0.248) (0.394) (0.500) (0.170) (0.256) (0.246) 
Non Islamic banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
       
R² (within) 0.080 0.1290 0.0939 0.0764 0.0738 0.0786 
sigma_u 0.0322 0.0300 0.0314 0.0314 0.0319 0.0319 
sigma_e 0.0206 0.0227 0.0222 0.0212 0.0210 0.0211 
rho 0.7083 0.6353 0.6657 0.6861 0.6966 0.6953 
Banks  145 81 108 130 133 134 
Observations  710 352 488 612 641 646 
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 Panel B: Quantity of Loans 
       
 Baseline Size ≤ 0.10 Size ≤ 0.25 Size ≤ 0.50 Size ≤ 0.75 Size ≤ 0.90 
Constant  3.255*** n.a n.a  n.a 3.0386*** 3.0549*** 
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
IVPCR (Pub.) 0.0043** 0.0052*** 0.0047** 0.0052*** 0.0054*** 0.0056*** 
 (0.017) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
IVPCB (Priv.) 0.0066** 0.0042 0.0080* 0.0072** 0.0072** 0.0075** 
 (0.038) (0.406) (0.086) (0.047) (0.041) (0.033) 
GDPpcg -0.0110*** -0.0073 0.0049 -0.0104*** -0.0109*** -0.0113*** 
 (0.000) (0.134) (0.135) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Inflation  -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0028* -0.0027 -0.0027* 
 (0.115) (0.431) (0.279) (0.094) (0.110) (0.087) 
Pop. density 0.0025* -0.0019 0.0028 0.0033 0.0027 0.0027 
 (0.090) (0.260) (0.232) (0.112) (0.151) (0.147) 
Deposit/Assets 0.3524* 0.5123** 0.3830* 0.3292* 0.3548* 0.3578* 
 (0.052) (0.034) (0.058) (0.088) (0.060) (0.056) 
Bank Branches 0.0547*** 0.0983*** 0.0665*** 0.0595*** 0.0553*** 0.0528*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small banks -0.0273 2.700*** 2.776*** 2.987*** 0.0061 0.0140 
 (0.611) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.915) (0.807) 
Big banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Cap. Openness  -0.0882 1.0727*** -0.0552 -0.0860 -0.0186 -0.0502 
 (0.270) (0.000) (0.838) (0.570) (0.873) (0.561) 
Cap. Closedness --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Domestic banks 0.1267 -0.1737 0.1236 0.2507 0.2567 0.2336 
 (0.684) (0.581) (0.725) (0.463) (0.438) (0.479) 
Foreign banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Islamic banks -0.2778 -0.1395 -0.3871 -0.1873 -0.2297 -0.2181 
 (0.535) (0.562) (0.455) (0.691) (0.617) (0.633) 
Non Islamic banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
       
R² (within) 0.3640 0.3813 0.3716 0.3821 0.3672 0.3660 
sigma_u 1.0538 0.9085 1.101 1.1008 1.0498 1.0454 
sigma_e 0.1640 0.1695 0.1604 0.1546 0.1578 0.1573 
rho 0.9763 0.9663 0.9792 0.9806 0.9778 0.9778 
Banks  145 81 108 130 133 134 
Observations  733 361 501 626 656 661 
       
*,**,***: significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumental Variable. PCR: Public credit registries. PCB: Private credit bureaus.  
IVPCR (Pub.): Instrumented Public credit registries. IVPCB (Priv.): Instrumented Private credit bureaus. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Pop. 
density: Population density. Cap: Capital.  na: omitted in the regression due to issues of multicolinearity.  P-values in brackets.  
 
 
 
The following four key findings can be confirmed from Table 3 on non-overlapping bank 
size thresholds. First, public credit registries have a decreasing effect on the price of loans and 
the rate of decline is not significantly different across our various specifications. Second, the 
effect of private credit bureaus on the price of loans is not statistically significant. Third, whereas 
both public credit registries and private credit bureaus considerably improve the quantity of 
loans, there is no apparent evidence that larger banks are associated with a lower magnitude in 
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the underlying positive effects. Moreover, private credit bureaus exert more favourable effect on 
quantity of loans  compared with public credit registries. Fourth, most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs. It is important to note that the findings with non-overlapping 
thresholds are broadly consistent with those that are conditional on overlapping thresholds.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Loan and Quantity Effects Using Non-overlapping Bank Size Thresholds  
       
 Dependent Variables: Price of Loan and Quantity of Loan 
       
 Panel A: Price of Loan 
       
 Baseline 0.10<Bank  
Size ≤ 0.25 
0.25<Bank 
Size ≤ 0.50 
0.50<Bank 
Size ≤ 0.75 
0.75<Bank 
Size ≤ 0.90 
0.90<Bank Size 
Constant  0.0718*** 0.0580** 0.0714*** 0.0695*** 0.0720*** n.a 
 (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
IVPCR (Pub.) -0.0005*** -0.0005** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0003* 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.072) 
IVPCB (Priv.) 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
 (0.562) (0.089 (0.262) (0.631) (0.639) (0.367) 
GDPpcg -0.0007 -0.0012** -0.0007 -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0004 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.121) (0.054) (0.069) (0.428) 
Inflation  0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0003 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) 
Pop. density 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00006 0.00006 0.00003 
 (0.180) (0.355) (0.371) (0.233) (0.212) (0.482) 
Deposit/Assets 0.0415*** 0.0610*** 0.0510*** 0.0438*** 0.0425*** 0.0353 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) 
Bank Branches -0.0013*** -0.0019* -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0005 
 (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.651) 
Small banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Big banks -0.0017 n.a n.a  n.a 0.0023 0.0546 
 (0.659)    (0.646) (0.307) 
Cap. Openness  --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Cap. Closedness -0.0083 -0.0007 -0.0080 -0.0103 -0.0105 0.0131 
 (0.208) (0.937) (0.390) (0.170) (0.132) (0.715) 
Domestic banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Foreign  banks -0.0006 -0.0076 -0.0060 -0.0039 -0.0031 0.0185 
 (0.926) (0.366) (0.421) (0.576) (0.652) (0.389) 
Islamic banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Non Islamic banks 0.0125 0.0190 0.0095 0.0155 0.0126 n.a 
 (0.248) (0.394) (0.500) (0.170) (0.256)  
       
R² (within) 0.0801 0.1290 0.0939 0.0764 0.0738 0.137 
sigma_u 0.0322 0.0300 0.0314 0.0314 0.0319 0.0349 
sigma_e 0.0206 0.0227 0.0222 0.0212 0.0210 0.0132 
rho 0.7083 0.6353 0.6657 0.6861 0.6966 0.8743 
Banks  145 81 108 130 133 19 
Observations  710 352 488 612 641 64 
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 Panel B: Quantity of Loan 
       
 Baseline 0.10<Bank  
Size ≤ 0.25 
0.25<Bank 
Size ≤ 0.50 
0.50<Bank 
Size ≤ 0.75 
0.75<Bank 
Size ≤ 0.90 
0.90<Bank Size 
Constant  2.988*** 3.460*** 2.457*** 2.964*** 3.053*** n.a  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
IVPCR (Pub.) 0.0043** 0.0052*** 0.0047** 0.0052*** 0.0054*** -0.0044** 
 (0.017) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) (0.040) 
IVPCB (Priv.) 0.0066** 0.0042 0.0080* 0.0072** 0.0072** 0.00001 
 (0.038) (0.406) (0.086) (0.047) (0.041) (0.994) 
GDPpcg -0.0110*** -0.0073 -0.0074 -0.0104*** -0.0109*** -0.0157*** 
 (0.000) (0.134) (0.135) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Inflation  -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0028* -0.0027 -0.0010 
 (0.115) (0.431) (0.279) (0.094) (0.110) (0.653) 
Pop. density 0.0025* -0.0019 0.0028 0.0033 0.0027 0.0066*** 
 (0.090) (0.260) (0.232) (0.112) (0.151) (0.000) 
Deposit/Assets 0.3524* 0.5123** 0.3830* 0.3292* 0.3548* -0.1352 
 (0.052) (0.034) (0.058) (0.088) (0.060) (0.299) 
Bank Branches 0.0547*** 0.0983*** 0.0665*** 0.0595*** 0.0553*** 0.1687*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Small banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Big banks 0.0273 n.a n.a n.a -0.0061 -2.964* 
 (0.611)    (0.915) (0.094) 
Cap. Openness  --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Cap. Closedness 0.0882 -1.072*** 0.0552 0.0860 0.0186 5.756*** 
 (0.270) (0.000) (0.838) (0.570) (0.873) (0.001) 
Domestic banks --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       
Foreign banks  -0.1267 0.1737 -0.1236 -0.2507 -0.2567 1.1869 
 (0.684) (0.581) (0.725) (0.463) (0.438) (0.118) 
Islamic banks --- --- --- ---- --- --- 
       
Non Islamic banks 0.2778 0.1395 0.3871 0.1873 0.2297 n.a 
 (0.535) (0.562) (0.455) (0.691) (0.617)  
       
R² (within) 0.3640 0.3813 0.3716 0.3821 0.3672 0.675 
sigma_u 1.0538 0.9085 1.101 1.100 1.049 1.2244 
sigma_e 0.1640 0.1695 0.1604 0.1546 0.1578 0.0957 
rho 0.9763 0.9663 0.9792 0.9806 0.9778 0.9939 
Banks 145 81 108 130 133 20 
Observations  733 361 501 626 656 72 
       
*,**,***: significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumental Variable. PCR: Public credit registries. PCB: Private credit bureaus.  
IVPCR (Pub.): Instrumented Public credit registries. IVPCB (Priv.): Instrumented Private credit bureaus. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth. Pop. 
density: Population density. Cap: Capital.  na: omitted in the regression due to issues of multicolinearity.  P-values in brackets.  
 
  
In what follows, we further discuss the findings from two main perspectives, notably the 
nexus with the extant literature and relevance of the QLH. The former perspective on the 
relations with existing literature is discussed from both non-comparative and comparative 
standpoints. First, on the comparative viewpoint we have literature that agrees and disagrees 
with the established findings. Accordingly, the results are in line with Singh et al. (2009) who 
have shown that in Africa, nations that promote the establishment of information sharing offices 
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benefit from higher levels of financial access in the perspective of credit to the private sector.  
Conversely, the findings run counter to Asongu et al. (2016) who have used macroeconomic 
variables to show that information sharing offices decrease financial development.  
Second, with regard to the comparative perspective, we also find studies that are both 
consistent and inconsistent with the main findings. The comparative argument here should be 
understood within the framework that private credit bureaus (public credit registries) have a 
higher effect in increasing financial access. This is because they have a higher significant 
positive effect on the quantity of loans and a decreasing effect on the price of loans. 
From the scope of quantity of loans, two studies have concluded on the higher 
comparative advantage of private credit bureaus, namely (i) Triki and Gajigo (2014) who 
concluded that financial access is on average higher in nations with private credit bureaus 
compared to countries with public credit registries or neither information sharing office and (ii) 
Love and Mylenko (2003) who  showed that in the presence of private registries, there are lower 
financing constraints and a higher share of bank financing  while, the effect on such limitations 
and benefits are not apparent in the presence of public registries. Conversely, the findings of 
Galindo and Miller (2001) are not in accordance with the previous two in the respect that credit 
registries are associated with less financial restrictions compared to credit bureaus that are less 
developed. The above comparative narrative in favour of private credit bureaus within the 
framework of quantity of loans can also be used to substantiate the comparative description in 
preference of public credit registries within the context of price of loans. 
On the latter perspective of market power, we have consistently recognized that the QLH 
does not withstand empirical validity. This is principally because we have not found evidence 
that distributions with higher representations of banks with large sizes are associated with lower 
(higher) “quantity of loans” (price of loans). On the contrary, there is some scanty evidence 
suggesting “reverse QLH”: bank size being an increasing function of lower loan price and higher 
loan quantity. Hence, in the light of the findings, we can confirm that managers of financial 
institutions in the African banking industry are taking advantage of information sharing offices 
to promote financial access contrary to the insinuations of the QLH. By extension, the 
information sharing offices (public credit registries and private credit bureaus) are playing their 
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theoretical role of reducing informational rents associated with information asymmetry between 
bank lenders and borrowers.  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Research Directions  
 
This study has investigated how bank size affects the role of information asymmetry on financial 
access in a panel of 162 banks in 39 African countries for the period 2001-2011.  The empirical 
evidence is based on instrumental variable Fixed Effects regressions with overlapping and non-
overlapping bank size thresholds to control for the QLH (Quiet Life Hypothesis). The QLH 
postulates that large banks will use their privileges for private gains at the expense of financial 
access. Financial access is measured with loan price and loan quantity whereas information 
asymmetry is understood in terms of the activities of public credit registries and private credit 
bureaus.  The findings with non-overlapping thresholds are broadly consistent with those that are 
provisional on overlapping thresholds. First, public credit registries have a reducing effect on the 
price of loans with the magnitude of reduction nearly comparable across different bank size 
thresholds.  Second, both public credit registries and private credit bureaus enhance the quantity 
of loans. Third, from a comparative perspective, private credit bureaus (public credit registries) 
have a higher effect in increasing financial access. This follows from our finding that private 
credit bureaus have a greater significant positive (decreasing) effect on the quantity of loans 
(price of loans). Fourth, the QLH is not apparent because large banks are not associated with 
lower levels of financial access relative to small banks.  
The main policy implication of this study is that, the institution of information sharing 
offices should be encouraged and consolidated across the continent because they are necessary in 
reducing information asymmetry that potentially constrain financial access. Future studies can 
improve the extant literature by assessing how information and communication technology tools 
can complement our chosen information sharing offices in order to further enhance financial 
access. The intuition for this recommendation is that information and communication technology 
is a natural instrument by which information sharing offices can accomplish their theoretical role 
of reducing information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the banking industry. 
Moreover, assessing whether the findings established in this study withstand empirical scrutiny 
when assessed within country-specific frameworks is a worthwhile future research direction 
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because such is necessary for more targeted country-specific policy recommendations. This 
recommendation is even more relevant given the apparent issues in degrees of freedom in 
information sharing offices for some of the sampled countries.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
Dependent 
variables  
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
Independent  Public credit registries  2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
variables  Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Openness (Kaopen)  0.232 0.422 0.000 1.000 1782 
Closedness (Kaopen)  0.767 0.422 0.000 1.000 1782 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Indep: Independent. 
Vble: Variable. Kaopen: de juré capital account openness.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix 
                  
Independent 
variables 
Control  Variables Dependent 
Variables 
 
Market-level Bank-level Dummies (for the unobserved heterogeneity)  
PCB PCR GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Ssize Lsize Open Closed Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. Price Qty  
1.00 -0.13 0.022 -0.12 -0.18 -0.10 0.143 0.103 -0.10 -0.003 0.003 0.176 -0.176 -0.080 0.080 0.111 -0.032 PCB 
 1.000 0.040 -0.20 0.435 -0.01 0.553 -0.08 0.084 0.022 -0.022 0.012 -0.012 0.026 -0.026 -0.282 -0.08 PCR 
  1.000 -0.03 -0.08 0.048 -0.057 -0.08 0.085 -0.064 0.064 0.065 -0.065 -0.021 0.021 -0.017 0.021 GDP 
   1.000 -0.05 0.057 -0.012 0.069 -0.06 -0.019 0.019 0.053 -0.053 -0.025 0.025 0.107 0.024 Infl. 
    1.000 0.126 0.350 -0.04 0.040 0.275 -0.275 -0.033 0.033 -0.112 0.112 0.045 -0.128 Pop. 
     1.000 0.028 -0.13 0.135 0.072 -0.072 -0.073 0.073 -0.236 0.236 0.106 0.292 D/A 
      1.000 -0.07 0.076 0.0008    -0.0008    0.143 -0.143 -0.036 0.036 -0.266 -0.182 Bbrchs 
       1.000 -1.00 0.167 -0.167 0.033 -0.033 0.026 -0.026 0.049 -0.218 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.167 0.167 -0.033 0.033 -0.026 0.026 -0.049 0.218 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.035 -0.035 -0.065 0.065 0.212 0.099 Open 
          1.000 -0.035 0.035 0.065 -0.065 -0.212 -0.099 Closed 
           1.000 -1.000 0.112 -0.112 0.017 0.038 Dom 
            1.000 -0.112 0.112 -0.017 -0.038 Foreign 
             1.000 -1.000 -0.106 0.116 Islamic 
              1.000 0.106 -0.036 NonIsl. 
               1.000 -0.036 Price 
                1.000 Qty 
                  
PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit 
on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small banks. Lsize: Large banks. Open: Capital openness. Closed: Capital closedness. Domestic: 
Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Qty: Quantity of Loans.  
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Appendix 3: Country-specific average values from information sharing offices  
   
 Public Credit Registries  Private Credit Bureaus 
   
1) Algeria 0.216 0 .000 
2) Angola 2.412 0.000 
3) Benin 8.037 0.000 
4) Botswana 0 .000 48.150 
5) Burkina Faso 1.750 0.000 
6) Burundi 0.212 0.000 
7) Cameroon 2.312 0.000 
8) Cape Verde 17.042 0.000 
9) Central African Republic  1.412 0.000 
10) Chad 0.400 0.000 
11) Comoros 0.000 0.000 
12) Congo Democratic Republic 0.000 0.000 
13) Congo Republic 3.400 0.000 
14) Côte d’Ivoire  2.487 0.000 
15) Djibouti 0.200 0.000 
16) Egypt 2.062 5.271 
17) Equatorial Guinea 2.566 0.000 
18) Eritrea 0.000 0.000 
19) Ethiopia  0.087 0.000 
20) Gabon 12.716 0.000 
21) The Gambia 0.000 0.000 
22) Ghana 0.000 1.700 
23) Guinea 0.000 0.000 
24) Guinea-Bissau 1.000 0.000 
25) Kenya 0.000 1.750 
26) Lesotho 0.000 0.000 
27)Liberia 0.280 0.000 
28) Libya na na 
29) Madagascar 0.162 0.000 
30) Malawi 0.000 0.000 
31) Mali 2.812 0.000 
32) Mauritania 0.187 0.000 
33) Mauritius  27.866 0.000 
34) Morocco 1.200 4.812 
35) Mozambique 1.637 0.000 
36) Namibia 0.000 50.362 
37) Niger 0.825 0.000 
38) Nigeria 0.025 0.000 
39) Rwanda 0.425 0.275 
40) Sao Tome & Principe 0.000 0.000 
41) Senegal 3.787 0.000 
42) Seychelles 0.000 0.000 
43) Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000 
44) Somalia na na 
45) South Africa 0.000 57.312 
46) Sudan 0.000 0.000 
47) Swaziland 0.000 40.216 
48) Tanzania 0.000 0.000 
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49) Togo 2.550 0.000 
50) Tunisia 15.975 0.000 
51) Uganda 0.000 0.512 
52)Zambia 0.000 0.975 
53) Zimbabwe 0.000 0.000 
   
na: not applicable because of missing observations. 
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